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A tale of two countries: perspectives from 
the South on the coherence of EU policies 
Paul Hoebink 
Introduction
Coherence of European development policy with other European policies has 
been in the debate for a series of years. This debate started, as we will see later, 
with the introduction of the concept in the Treaty of Maastricht. As such it was 
taken up by some Member States, but also by European development NGOs. At 
the end of April 1993 for example European NGOs started lobbying against the 
meat exports to West Africa (or rather the subsidies on such exports). They 
maintained that these exports could be regarded as dumping and that they 
therefore disrupted the local meat markets. Over the years it has been in 
particular the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which was in the middle of 
the debate,1 strengthened in the last years by criticisms from international 
development institutions, like the World Bank, and by the Doha-round of 
negotiations in the World Trade Organisations (WTO), in which groups of 
producers and exporters of agricultural products filed several complaints against 
protectionist policies and market distortions of the EU. 
In this debate voices from the South are mostly heard indirectly, via NGOs in 
Brussels or in the capitals of the Members States, via their lawyers in the WTO. 
It is the intention of this paper to show some Southern perspectives on the 
coherence of European policies vis-à-vis developing countries. This research 
started from the question: What kind of incoherencies in European policies with 
regard to developing countries are identified by important actors in developing 
countries themselves? It is based on a series of interviews with high ranking 
officials of government institutions and civil society organisations, like 
employers’ federations, trade unions, chambers of commerce, women’s 
organisations and human rights NGOs. Since we are restricted in space in this 
article, I will in contrast to the larger report in both case studies concentrate the 
analysis on trade and fisheries. 
Policy coherence: Definitions and background 
Policy coherence is a relatively new concept both in politics and in the political 
sciences. There is in fact no mention of it in the standard textbooks on the social 
sciences. Even in dictionaries on European politics it is absent. To arrive at a 
                                                          
1. The effects of the CAP on export possibilities for developing countries of course has been under 
discussion from the end of the 1960s, from the beginning of Ton van Naerssen’s academic career, in 
particular via the cane versus beet sugar campaigns, but only partly under the denominator of ‘policy 
coherence’. 
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definition we must therefore first consult the dictionaries. As said these suggest 
that (in common parlance or philosophy) coherence is synonymous with 
consistency. Consistency and coherence of thought and statement therefore mean 
‘free from self-contradiction’. Policy coherence could therefore be defined as:  
‘The non-occurrence of effects that are contrary to the intended results or 
objectives of this policy’. 
For this purpose coherence can be defined either narrowly or broadly (see 
below). A narrow definition would be that objectives of policy in a particular 
field may not be undermined or obstructed by actions or activities in this field. 
And a wide definition would be that objectives of policy in a particular field may 
not be undermined or obstructed by actions or activities of government in that 
field or in other policy fields.  
The concept of policy coherence gained influence or, to put it more correctly, 
was introduced into European policies by the Treaty of Maastricht. The Treaty 
referred to coherence/consistency in its foreign policy in Article C (see below), 
but for development cooperation policy Article 130U and 130V were in 
particular important. Article 130 V of Title XVII of the Treaty on European 
Union - the Maastricht Treaty - states that [CEC/CEC, 1992:61]: The Community 
shall take account of the objectives referred to in Article 130 U in the policies 
that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.’
This article could be called the Maastricht Treaty's ‘coherence article’ in the 
field of development co-operation. It was sustained in the Treaty of Amsterdam 
under Title XX as Article 178.  Article 130V refers to Article 130U.  
There are different ways to classify coherence. We will not go into detail 
here,2 but it is important to present a classification to be able to define the 
different elements of policy coherence and the causes for incoherence. This 
classification of coherence stems from the perspective of the viewer. Coherence 
can have a narrow or restricted angle, or a broad one. With regard to policy 
coherence this means that it can focus on one terrain or field of policy only, or 
try to make links with other fields or domains of policies. The restricted 
definition places coherence within one terrain of government policy. We could 
also call this internal coherence, because the assessment of policy coherence 
stays here within the limits of the domain of a given policy. At a contrast, the 
broad definition will look at the way the attainment of a given set of goals of 
government policies in a certain field are stimulated or hampered by government 
policy or policies in another field or other terrains. 
The restricted (2) or internal (2) type is incoherence between different sets of 
foreign policy and development co-operation policy, e.g. between trade policies 
and development co-operation, between security policy and development co-
operation, between human rights policies and development co-operation. 
The third type is the broad or external one, including incoherence between 
development co-operation policies and policies in other fields, which can in 
theory, be all parts of European policy making. In principle it will be those 
policies most likely to affect also developing countries. In effect this will mean 
the CAP, CFP, certain consumer protection policies, parts of (global) 
environmental policies, industrial policies. 
2 For a more detailed overview see. Hoebink (1999 and 2004). 
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Notwithstanding the efforts to achieve coherence of policy, incoherence is 
often a given. First, as government has to deal with many parties and pressure 
groups, it may well be impossible to find optimal solutions that satisfy all parties 
concerned and achieve all objectives. This is, of course even more so in the 
European Union, where the number of stakeholders and parties is much larger 
than at a national level. Second, government is not a unitary whole, but generally 
consists of a large number of departments, institutions and corporations.3 These 
departments and institutions take a large number of policy measures, monitor 
their implementation and are quite often faced with conflicting interests. Third, it 
is difficult to weigh all the factors, interests and parties and their reactions to an 
initial policy decision and even more difficult to weigh them on prognostics of 
an unknown future. Consequently, it is often unclear what will be the precise 
effects or side effects of the policy.  
Morocco and EU Policy Coherence 
Morocco and the EEC after the Treaty of Rome.  
Morocco has a long standing relationship with the EEC/EU. Morocco’s strong 
historical and cultural links and its economy heavily dependent on the French 
market, integrated in the Franc zone, should have led to an early association with 
the Community. Such an early association should also have been in line with the 
Joint Declaration of Intent to the Treaty of Rome, in which it was promised to 
start quickly with negotiations with Morocco (and Tunisia) to safeguard 
traditional trade flows. It nevertheless lasted thirteen years after Morocco’s 
independence before in 1969 the first limited special association agreement 
(under Article 238) came into force. This could be seen as symbolic for the 
relationship between Morocco and the EEC/EU, or even for the incoherent 
policy of the EEC/EU vis-à-vis the Maghreb/Mediterranean countries. 
Cooperation with the Mediterranean countries started with a case by case 
approach, allowing for full association with Greece and Turkey at the beginning 
of the sixties and limited association with Tunisia, Morocco (end of the sixties), 
Malta and Cyprus (beginning of the seventies). Other countries (Yugoslavia, 
Israel, Lebanon) however got non-preferential agreements. Morocco and Tunisia 
were said to be in the midst of the Pyramid of preferences competing with its 
citrus and olive oil directly with Italian producers. Negotiations were often 
difficult, in particular with those wine, citrus and olive oil producers, from which 
Italy feared competition. The Community was thus not able to ‘follow a coherent 
policy vis-à-vis this important neighbouring area’.4 The general line was that 
industrial products could freely enter into the Common Market, what was also in 
line with the reallocation of European textiles, clothing and shoe production to 
for example Spain, Tunisia and Morocco, but that agricultural products faced 
high tariffs or quota limitations. Its is clear that production in the Maghreb 
countries was and is not complementary to (southern) European production as it 
is with most ACP countries and thus led to a more protectionist policy from the 
3. Weatherford [1994], emphasises that in the economic literature government is, however, often 
regarded as a unitary actor. 
4 Grilli (1993: 181). 
190 
                                                          
side of the EEC/EU. This was reinforced with the accession of in particular 
Spain to the EU and has more or less been the line since then. Political elements 
weighed heavily in the relations what in particular can be read from European 
reluctance to go into deeper relations with authoritarian regimes in Greece, 
Spain, Morocco and Turkey. Aid was very limited in this period up to 1979, 
consisting mainly of loans. 
A second phase in this relationship with the Mediterranean began, when in 
Paris in 1972 the European Council adopted the so-called ‘Global Mediterranean 
Policy’. ‘Global’ only meant in this case that the treatment of the Mediterranean 
countries should become more systematic, but this new policy also included 
cooperation agreements that had a bit broader scope, including next to trade 
issues also aid. Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria signed more or less identical 
cooperation agreements in 1976. The negotiations were described as being 
‘bitter’, in which the Northern partners were willing to extend more concessions 
to industrial products, while Morocco and Tunisia were looking for better 
prospects for their agricultural products. With Greece, Spain and Portugal as 
newly coming EC-members, it could not be expected that many concessions with 
regard to agricultural products could be made. It meant that in particular Tunisia 
and Morocco lost out. It meant also that quantitative restrictions on textiles and 
clothing imports from Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt were introduced. The trade 
preferences thus stayed far from the French proposal at that time of establishing 
a free trade area in the Mediterranean. In the so-called ‘pyramid of privileges’ 
the southern Mediterranean countries were clearly lower than the ACP countries. 
A series of Cooperation Agreements though and financial protocols attached to 
them allowed for a modest increase in technical and financial grants and loans. 
But due tot the economic crisis of the seventies, it meant also that the amounts of 
aid stayed modest.5
In those years Morocco filed a formal application – after an informal one was 
rebuffed in 1984 – to become member of the EC in 1987. The Moroccan 
application was rejected on basis of Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome which is 
said to reserve membership to European countries.6 At the positive side of this 
application was that it gave Morocco a better place at the European agenda with 
a first visit of Jacques Delors in the autumn of 1987. 
Europe’s little coherent policy vis-à-vis the southern Mediterranean had a new 
change in 1989. After the second enlargement which brought the 
‘Mediterraneans’ Spain, Portugal and Greece into the Community the focus of 
the EU was clearly more southward. Added to this was that the economic crisis 
of the 1980s did hit countries as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt heavily. Morocco 
was hit in particular by a strong reduction in aid from the Gulf States and by low 
phosphate prices on the world market. Europe’s so-called ‘New Mediterranean 
Policy’ initiated in 1989 should address the problems of youth unemployment, 
growing poverty and immigration. The new policy aimed at introducing market 
reform (and in this following at a distance IMF policies), stimulating private 
investment and giving better market access. At the same time when European 
5 Under the first financial protocol for four years (1978-1981) it was ECU 659 million for eight 
countries, for a major part EIB loans. Egypt was the main receiver with about ECU 43 million a year; 
Jordan received ECU 10 million a year. Under the third financial protocol (1987-1991) the total 
amount grew to ECU 1.5 billion. (Cox/Chapman, 1999: ch.4). 
6 Haddadi, 2002,  pp.151-152. 
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institutions came with quite substantial criticism on European protectionism vis-
à-vis the Mediterranean countries (in particular with regard to agricultural 
products and textiles) however, very little changed in this respect. Aid flows did 
grow between 1987 and 1991 with 62 per cent, but still clearly lagged behind 
what was invested in other programmes.  
After the Luxembourg Council declaration on human rights (1991) the 
European Parliament voted in favour of a freeze of development assistance to 
Morocco on ground of human rights abuses in the Western Sahara and in 
Moroccan prisons. The discussion was fuelled by international NGOs and by 
Gilles Perrault’s book about human rights violations, Notre Ami le Roi, 
published in 1990. Morocco answered strongly by cutting of the negotiations on 
a new fishing agreement.7 It all led to more diplomatic exchange, to more 
discussions in Europe on its relationship with the southern Mediterranean 
countries and finally a Spanish proposal to intensify relations with the Maghreb. 
The Euro-Maghreb Partnership quickly lost momentum but found its way to 
Cannes and Barcelona. Also at the Moroccan side Hassan II introduced 
democratic reforms, amongst others creating a Consultative Council of Human 
Rights. 
This all is said to have become part of the past in 1995. The European summit 
in Cannes in June 1995 and the following Barcelona Summit with the 
Mediterranean countries in December in the same year are in the European 
Union’s documents described as a ‘watershed’, a major change in which issues 
as: common security, peace and stability, an ‘area of shared prosperity’, the 
development of human resources and relations between civil societies are said to 
be integrated into a broad cooperation. What is clear is that the fear for the 
upcoming Muslim fundamentalism in particular in Algeria, forced the European 
Union to take a new position vis-à-vis the southern Mediterranean countries. In 
the follow-up of the Barcelona Summit negotiations again appeared very 
difficult. Only small steps were taking into the direction of a free trade area that 
should be created in 2010. A series of Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements are replacing the old cooperation agreements. Each of these 
agreements contains articles on a gradual elimination of custom duties, but for 
agricultural products special provisions are made. The agreements are thus more 
comprehensive and covering all areas of the Barcelona Declaration, but are not 
going very far or deep. 
After a Euro-Mediterranean Summit in 1991 and the Barcelona Summit aid 
commitments and disbursements did gradually grow again in the second half of 
the 1990s, since the Council in 1995 devoted € 3.4 billion up to 2000 for the 
special MEDA I budget line, created in October 1996 as a follow up of the 4th
financial protocol. The main aid receiver stayed Egypt, with in a second echelon 
Morocco. Water supply was the main sector for European aid, where it was 
agriculture in earlier years.8 Morocco signed its European Mediterranean 
Association Agreement (EMAA) already in 1996 and thus, with Tunisia, was the 
first to become part of the European-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). 
The MEDA programme has been substituted by the Neighbourhood 
Programme and Morocco is by far the biggest receiver in this programme. The 
7 Idem, p.153. 
8 Also this is seen as an example that the EU is not willing to allow competition in this sector with its 
southern Member States. 
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European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument  (ENPI ) is endowed with €11.9 
billion for 2007-2013. For the period 2007-2010 the funds allocated to the 
Moroccan government amount to € 654million. As the Commission puts it: 
‘These funds will be spent in contributing to Morocco's ongoing economic 
reform’.
Trade between Morocco and the EU.  
The EU is Morocco’s biggest trading partner. In particular the export 
dependency of Morocco is standing out with between 66 and 75 per cent of its 
exports directed at the European market. In terms of imports more than half 
stems from the EU. The balance of trade is still positive at the EU side. Trade 
between the EU and Morocco did grow fast in the 1990s. EU imports from 
Morocco grew with 85 per cent between 1993 and 2002 (growing from € 3,394 
million to € 6,265 million). Since 2002 trade stagnated. EU imports from 
Morocco went up to € 7.8 billion in 2007.  EU exports to Morocco grew a bit 
slower with 80 per cent between 1993 and 2002 (from € 4,237 million in 1993 to 
€ 7,624 million in 2002), but went up quicker after 2002 to € 12 billion in 2007. 
Morocco’s traditional and main exports to the EU are still food products 
(citrus fruits, vegetables like tomatoes and fishery products). The export of citrus 
fruits is more or less stagnant, while fish and crustaceans exports are increasing 
and vegetable exports are more important than fruits. More recently also flowers 
became an important agricultural export product, but exports are dwindling. 
Agricultural products account for a fifth of the EU's total imports from Morocco, 
and 6 per cent of its total exports. In 2002, the EU imported agricultural products 
from Morocco for a value of over € 1,318 million, while it exported for a worth 
of € 428 million. Industrial products exported are mainly textiles and clothing, 
although recently also automotive parts gained in importance. Textiles and 
garments represent about the same value as agricultural products. Main imports 
are fabrics for the textile and clothing industries, various types of machinery and 
equipment, chemicals, and wheat. Industrial products enter the EU duty-free. 
Agricultural export products are bound to quotas, seasons and duties. Under the 
Association Agreement the EU and Morocco granted each other some trade 
concessions for certain agricultural products. In Article 18 of the Agreement it is 
stipulated that discussions should be held with the objective to come to a further 
reciprocal liberalisation of agricultural trade. 
Problems with Exports 
According to the entrepreneurs, the Moroccan economy can potentially profit 
tremendously from trade liberalisation. They esteem that (internal and external) 
liberalisation that has already taken place over the past decade has boosted the 
Moroccan economy, created jobs, and decreased poverty. Main opponents of 
liberalisation are those with stakes in the former economic state monopolies, 
which produced low quality products for high prices. Since the internal 
liberalisation, prices have gone down and quality has gone up. Decreased import 
tariffs and a reduction of corruption have also had positive effects. The 
association agreement is positively evaluated as such, but on the condition that 
its functions well. There are severe doubts on the ‘equity’ principle: Up to now, 
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concrete policies like agrarian protection, the very difficult circulation of 
business people, and the de facto low support to increase competencies of 
Morocco’s labour force (e.g. through education, internships, etc.).  
Tariff and non-tariff protection is a problem, but this can eventually be solved 
through negotiations. EU support for sectors like agriculture is seen as a much 
bigger problem. However, the most fundamental problem is the lack of 
competitiveness of the Moroccan economy. Entrepreneurs esteem that it is 
absolutely necessary to improve competencies of Morocco’s enterprises and 
labour force. This so-called mise à niveau operation is not only important to 
increase efficiency of production, but also – and which is equally important – in 
the interest of the vital process of standardisation. The latter means that Morocco 
will be able to comply with EU’s quality standards for export commodities (to 
circumvent non-tariff protection), that management processes comply with ISO 
standards, harmonisation of commercial law, juridical procedures, and 
accountancy standards, and mutual recognition of diplomas. This can only be 
achieved through support from outside and through education and training of 
Moroccan professionals.  
In general industrial products have a duty-free access to the European market, 
but the exceptions are in sectors that are of particular importance for Moroccan 
industries. High tariffs, in comparison with ACP-countries, still prevail on 
textiles, apparel, and footwear. Duties are double in comparison with ACP-
countries. The ‘production-complementarity’ with the southern European states 
also in these sectors plays a negative role as seen from the Moroccan 
perspective. 
No cases of unfair competition from European imports were reported. The 
general fear of ‘rough’ competition from China is much more prevalent among 
officials and employers, but also from the side of independent economic 
analysts.
Fisheries
Most probably the most contested dossier in the relation between Morocco and 
the EU are the fisheries agreement or, better formulated, the negotiations on the 
fisheries agreement. It is a general feeling among Moroccan officials as well as 
Moroccan NGOs and entrepreneurs  that during the negotiations ‘the door was 
slapped in the Moroccan’ face’, because it was more lucrative in the final end for 
Spain not to come to an agreement. Spain then would be able to look for 
financial compensation in Brussels. From the other side the general statement is 
that Moroccan demands were too high to being fulfilled by the Union. But the 
issue is so sensitive and delicate that for example officials from DG Fisheries 
hardly dare to touch it. What is clear, is that a compensation of about € 72 
million a year was already paid in 2000 to Portuguese and (mainly) Spanish 
fishermen. 
The third Fisheries Agreement between Morocco and the European 
Community expired on 20 November 1999. Under this agreement nearly 500 
vessels in total and more than 400 Portuguese and Spanish vessels were fishing 
in the Moroccan waters. The financial went to € 500 million over the life of the 
agreement, making it the most important and most costly fishing agreement. 
These agreements could be seen as an extension of the agreement Spain had with 
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Morocco before. In discontent with the results of the agreements the Moroccan 
government tried to get a larger compensation at the same time reducing the 
number of European (Spanish) vessels in the Moroccan waters. Therefore a first 
agreement was concluded already in 1988. In the 1990s Morocco ‘absorbed 
about 40 per cent of the EU budget for third countries agreements and accounted 
for about 54 per cent of the total value of catches. Of the 477 vessels allowed to 
fish in Moroccan waters 404 were Spanish, coming mainly from Andalusia, 
Galicia, and the Canaries). With the second agreements of 1992 compensation 
were already increased with 50 per cent. The negotiations on a new agreement 
were already very difficult in 1995 and nearly collapsed. In the third fisheries 
agreement financial compensation took a new height and € 145 million were 
added for projects of scientific research, training and co-operation. 
During 1999 and 2000 continuing negotiations took place in Brussels as well 
as in Rabat. The Moroccans offered several options to the Union. The first was 
an agreement at cost of € 90 million a year with increased landings and a reduced 
number of European vessels. The second contained an agreement with 100 
percent landing obligations in Morocco. The third and the fourth offered fishing 
rights only on non-sensitive species with proportional or no financial 
compensation at all. It was in particular the high financial compensation that was 
seen as disproportionate by the Community. It was suggested that on the number 
of vessels, landing obligations, fishing zones and biological rest periods 
agreement could be reached. In line with Morocco’s discontent on the low level 
of cooperation and landings in Morocco, it offered the Community a choice 
between a high compensation and a low level of cooperation or limited and 
largely reduced access. Finally the negotiations went into a deadlock in March 
2001. According to Commissioner Franz Fischler ‘the Moroccan expectation 
went far beyond any reasonable evaluation’. It was stated that the EU was keen 
to conclude an agreement which would also take account of Moroccan interests 
and was also willing to accept that most EU vessels would have to land their 
catches in Moroccan ports. 
A main point of divergence was said to be the fishing levels (vessels, 
biological rest periods, gear) for ‘key commercial fisheries, notably cephalopods 
and shrimps’. Morocco wanted a reduction for these species of 60 to 80 per cent. 
It was concludes that what Morocco was offering, was ‘not interesting to major 
sections of the fleet’, e.g. Spanish vessels. Under the earlier agreement 113 
shrimp trawlers and 86 cephalopod vessels did have access to Moroccan waters. 
Two opinions can be heard on the collapse of the negotiations. One states that 
Morocco negotiated too hard and overplayed its hand. It now lost as well the 
compensation as well part of the landings. It is said that Morocco misses the 
economic and technical capabilities to operate a large scale fishing fleet. Now 
Japanese, Korean and Russian ships are seen fishing in the Moroccan waters. 
Some state partly illegally because the Moroccan marine is not able to control 
the Moroccan fishing waters, but at least with little financial compensation to 
Morocco. Recent figures of the Ministry show that in particular catches of 
crustaceans and cephalopods have gone down in recent years. 
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Another observation most heard in Rabat and Casablanca states that it was the 
EU, in casu Spain, which blocked the negotiations.9 Moroccan officials all 
indicate that they were disillusioned with the three earlier agreements in the light 
of the limited development benefits they brought to Morocco. The agreements 
were seen as exploitative alone, offering European vessels the richness of the 
Moroccan waters for just a financial compensation not on a basis of cooperation 
for development. The fear was underlined that Morocco would sell the riches of 
its seas and that it would end being overexploited and empty as the 
Mediterranean. 
What struck the Moroccans hardest – and is seen as the ultimate example of 
the hand of Spain in these negotiations – that as a result of the collapse of the 
negotiations also fisheries projects were ended. If these projects are part of the 
development cooperation relation between Morocco and the EU, why then would 
they be suspended, if negotiations on a commercial agreement can not be 
concluded, is the question most commonly asked. If the EU is serious about the 
support of 200.000-250.000 small fishermen10 why then stop the technical 
support? Why stop the support for research on fish stocks? 
Senegal and the EU 
Senegal, the Treaty of Rome, and the Lomé and Cotonou Conventions 
Senegal has been part of the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions from the 
beginning. It was already part of the group of Associated African and Malagasy 
States (AAMS) consisting mainly out of French and Belgian colonies in Africa 
(in total 18 states in 1963), which together with the Overseas Territories were the 
negotiating body with the Community after the signing of the Treaty of Rome. 
With the independence of several African states at the end of the 1950s and the 
beginning of the 1960s, Articles 131-136 of the Treaty of Rome were not 
binding them anymore. Negotiations started on new forms of association with 
the EC. Senegal became independent in 1959 and is said to be also one of the 
very active members of the group in these negotiations which finally resulted in 
the Convention of Yaoundé of July 1963 (with 18 African states) and six years 
later to Yaoundé II, which was mainly a copy of Yaoundé I. Unilateral 
association thus became ‘negotiated association’ (Grilli 1993:19) and Senegal’s 
Leopold Senghor, as one of the more moderate African leaders played an 
important role in it. 
Since the 18 of Yaoundé I, mainly former French and Belgian colonies, did not 
have to fear the competition of former British colonies yet, aid levels and access 
to the European market remained more or less unchanged. It did put the AAMS 
group of countries in a privileged position. In exchange European access to their 
markets and rights of EC citizens put the EC in a favourable position. Senegal 
9 It has to be noted that Spain received € 170 million (Portugal € 24) in 2000 and 2001 alone as 
compensation for fishermen and vessel owners affected by the non-renewal of the Morocco 
agreement. 
10 One of the sensitive issues at stake here is of course the fact that most of the artisanal fishermen 
fish in the coastal waters of the Western Sahara. 
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took part in all this, as also in all the structures  (Association Council, 
Parliamentary Conference) that were created alongside 
Senghor also played a pivotal role in the negotiations on Lomé I in the 
beginning of the 1970s. Under his leadership and that of the Nigerians the 
AAMS group quickly found themselves in a ‘cohesive and aggressive 
negotiating group’ (Grilli 1993:27) of ACP-countries. It led to an inclusion of the 
export revenue stability instrument Stabex financed by the Community and the 
abandonment of reciprocity in trade relations between the ACO and the EC. 
Furthermore the Sugar Protocol, making a first small inroad in European 
agricultural protectionism was part of these ‘aggressive’ negotiations. 
The privileged position of West-African, Sahel and other Francophone 
countries however changed little after in 1975, when in Lomé I Eastern and 
Southern African countries were integrated. Aid per capita, also to Senegal, 
stayed on average four times higher. Lomé II and Lomé III also brought only 
minor changes in this position. This became even more obvious in the second 
half of the 1980s when Senegal (and Ivory Coast) were hit by economic 
recession. Both countries, which economically did quite well since 
independence, then suffered from their integration in the Franc zone, weakening 
their position in the international commodity markets. As a consequence direct 
EU aid to Senegal in that period increased tenfold, from $ 6 million tot $ 65 
million in 1988. 
In the line-up for the negotiations on the Cotonou Convention also criticisms 
on Senegalese economic policies grew. It was indicated that Senegal lost a fifth 
of its export markets since the 1980s, because its exports made no progress at 
all.11 It was one of the signs that trade preferences in the Lomé Conventions only 
worked for a small number of states. The Economic Partnership Agreements are 
one of the new instruments of the Cotonou Convention to foster trade between 
the EU and the ACP-countries and among regional groups themselves. New 
Country Strategy Papers should also in the case of Senegal in anew format plan 
for old and new instruments and be a monitoring instrument to follow progress. 
Several local participants, among which Civil Society organisation should take 
part in the process of the formulation of the new CSPs. 
There is also quite some discussion on the EPAs. One of the issues put forward 
is about the necessity of the institution of an EPA, when there is already a WTO 
which is already covering issues as reciprocity and market access. Some NGOs 
also indicate that there are two types of countries in the region, Least Developed 
Countries and others, and that, if the LDCs get a better access to the European 
Market, this might lead to dislocation of a certain set of activities to these LDCs. 
Whereas cooperation between these countries is a major goal of the EPAs this 
could lead to collisions. The situation in West-Africa is seen as even more 
complicated as one has to deal also with differences between Anglophone and 
Francophone countries (apart from Arab phone) with all the differences in 
culture attached to it. 
Also the philosophy behind the EPAs is criticised. It suggests that free trade 
leads to more economic growth and that thus what African countries are going to 
gain  by it will be more than they are going to loose by the termination of the 
11 Statement of the EU-delegate Manuel Lopez Blanco, Le Soleil, 5 June 2004. It is important to note 
that Lopez Blanco was the main architect of the trade paragraphs of the EU Green Paper containing 
the EU’s proposals for the renegotiation of Lomé. 
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trade preferences. This philosophy is qualified as dubious. What African 
countries might win on some products, they are certainly going to loose on 
others. These losses might be compensated within the EPA, but this is at the 
level of the state and is not a compensation for producers and labourers. In this 
respect in particular European protectionism in agriculture is under criticism, 
with which we will deal later. 
Trade
Exports
Senegal’s exports are highly concentrated in the primary sector and primary 
products represent 90% of export income. Its exports consist mainly of 
groundnut, phosphate and fisheries. Of them fisheries is the most important, 
contributing between 35 and 40% to export income. Fisheries exports even 
contributed 56% to total exports in 1995. In the first five 1990s there was only a 
very slight growth of exports of manufactured goods, concentrated in a very 
limited number of firms and a negligible impact on employment.12
Over the years since independence Senegal lost considerably in market share. 
Its per capita exports are among the lowest in the world. In the 1990s there was 
even a drop in export incomes of about 2 per cent per year, while at the same 
time other SSA countries saw a growth of on average 5 per cent per year.13 This 
drop was in particular caused by the high and unrealistic exchange rate of the 
CFA. In money terms exports regained from 1995, after the devaluation of the 
CFA. But in the second half of the 1990s in particular reduced prices and 
reduced volumes of phosphate, vegetable oils, shrimps and lobster caused a new 
slide in exports. Fisheries exports fell dramatically again in 2000 and 2001, good 
prices however kept income more or less stable. Also the groundnut (oil) exports 
did relatively well. 14
Traditionally 40-45% of the Senegalese exports have Europe as destination. 
But exports to the EU are going down in relative terms and are less then 30% at 
the moment. This is mainly due to the fall of fisheries exports. Main European 
importers are France, Italy and Greece. About 30% of the exports are going to 
African countries, mainly to the ‘Hinterland’, countries in West-Africa. The 
market of the Americas is negligible and collects not more than 1% of the 
exports. Senegal’s exports to the EU were thus reduced from € 453 million in 
2001 and € 521 million in 2005 to € 372 million in 2007. 78% of these exports in 
2007 were still agricultural products. The EU exports to Senegal were € 1.8 
billion in 2007. 
Groundnuts are the most important product for cash income for the rural 
population. Whereas more than half of the Senegalese population is considered 
to be poor, 75 to 80% of the rural households were poor. Growth in agriculture is 
stagnating and also is the production of groundnuts, although since the 
devaluation of the CFA franc (1994) is slight increase occurred from 1997 to 
2001. Half of primary sector output comes from agriculture. Since the 
12 World Bank (1997: 20-25). 
13 Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances (2003 : 133-161). And : Le Soleil, 17 December 2002. 
14 Ibidem. 
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millennium there was strong growth of agricultural production, but this growth is 
seen as very fragile and with little effect on rural poverty yet. In 2000 agriculture 
contributed 21% to exports and 17% to Senegal’s GDP, while half of the labour 
force was employed in agriculture. Senegal is the 6th producer on a world scale 
behind China, India the USA, Nigeria and Indonesia. Its share in world 
production however was more than halved between 1970 and 2000, from 5.5% 
of world production to 2.3%. 
It is a general feeling under Senegalese producers that European agricultural 
policies need to be restructured. This holds for the problems Senegalese 
producers are confronted with when European products are ‘dumped’ on the 
Senegalese market (see below), but also with regard to the access for Senegalese 
(African) products to the European market. Access of agricultural products might 
be without problem ‘off-season’, but they are directly confronted with high 
tariffs at moments that European products are harvested and brought onto the 
market. Senegalese tomatoes (and Moroccan beans) are quoted as examples. 
Phyto-sanitary regulations are a second problem here. The EU-regulation of 
aflatoxin is quoted as the main example here. The EU regulation allows for much 
lower levels of aflatoxin than the Codex Alimentarius. It has been argued that 
maximum levels set in the Codex stem from a deliberate legislative process of 
weighing by international health experts in the FAO and WHO, while European 
levels were set as an average of levels set by the Member States.15 These higher 
levels cause serious problems for producers of nuts, groundnuts and dried fruits. 
In the legislative process the EU did not take did not take their interests into 
account, not in terms of what are reasonable maximum levels, neither in granting 
developing countries a transitional period. Senegal, as an important producer of 
ground nuts, is one of the victims. Of course reducing aflatoxin levels is a matter 
of training and improvement of agricultural practices of Senegalese farmers, but 
changes in these practices, as has been concluded in the quoted study on this 
case, take time and a huge effort of extension services. It is suggested that the 
EU could have been more complaisant. The introduction of the new phyto-
sanitary regulation by the General Food Law coming into force from January 
2006 show the same lacunae as those observed in the aflatoxin case. 
Imports
There are a series of imports stemming from Europe which are said to be 
incoherent with European policies. The two main incoherencies indicated are: 1 
that import hamper or even destroy local Senegalese production; 2. that some 
imports are bad for the environmental conditions in Senegal. In both cases NGOs 
and employers federation state that the Senegalese government has not the will 
or the power to regulate these imports better. It is said to be under pressure of 
WTO trade-rules or that it does not want to complicate relations with the EU and 
thus not is able or wants to counteract on these imports. 
To the first type of imports belong in particular imports of agricultural 
products. Some stem from Asia. The liberalisation of the world market also for 
food products makes competition with rice imports from Asian countries very 
difficult for producers in the Fleuve region. Import surges from Europe, in 
15 I.Moonen (2004:6 and Chapter 4). 
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particular from the Netherlands, most recently have created serious problems for 
Senegalese producers. They were reported not only by some NGOs but also in 
the Senegalese newspapers. Most strongly brought forward is the case of chicken 
legs. Other cases appearing in the local press in Senegal are onions and potatoes. 
Other products quoted, but not sustained with case material, are milk powder and 
wheat.
In the 1990s food imports in Senegal more than tripled.16 One of the main 
reasons is said to be the general reduction of import tariffs by the successive 
implementation of structural adjustment programmes. Tariffs on poultry meat 
imports were thus in several steps lowered from 55% to 20%. The Senegalese 
government requested the WTO for a waiver to maintain a system of reference 
prices for a series of 20 food products, including poultry and milk powder. This 
request was partly granted. While imports of poultry meat were negligible at the 
mid 1990s they grew to more than 11,000 tonnes in 2003,17 mainly consisting of 
frozen cuts (legs) from the Netherlands (about two thirds) and Belgium. At the 
same time local production declined. Imports thus grew from only 1% of local 
consumption to 19% in 2002, according to the FAO statistics. A similar pattern 
can be established with the imports of milk powder (from France), but here local 
production remained fairly stable. Producer organisations indicate that 70% of 
broiler farms around the urban areas have closed and that the sector is in a crisis. 
A spokesman of the Ministry of Agriculture reports a production decline of 30%. 
Up to mid-2003 small export restitutions were given by the EU on about a third 
of the total volume exported in the last seven years. The Senegal case, together 
with similar cases from West-Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Ivory 
Coast) served as an example in a campaign of French and Belgium NGOs under 
the title ‘L’Europe plume l’Afrique’. 
Similar problems are reported on onions and potato imports. Imports of onions 
have surged to 30.000 tonnes in the last years, 50% more than in 2002. In 
principle Senegal is self sufficient with a production of 100,000 tonnes and a 
consumption of 70,000 tonnes. Post-harvest losses however are rather high. 
Imports of potatoes have increased to more than 10.000 tonnes. In the case of 
potatoes local production stagnated and there were also problems with 
conservation. Urban consumers in these cases seem to prefer the quality of 
imported potatoes and onions, because prices of these are reported to be 25% to 
50% higher than those of local products, according to the season.18 Recent 
reports indicate that local products show a better resistance to foreign imports. 
The second incoherence is addressing the import of second hand cars and 
computers. Total imports of second hand cars were around 24.000 a year 
16 FAO, Committee on Commodity Problems, Impact of import surges: country case study results. 
Rome, April 2004. See also: Agir Ici a.o., Exportations de poulets: l’Europe plume l’Afrique, Paris 
2004. Sufa International, Impact des importations de volailles en Afrique de l’Ouest. Bruxelles : 
InfoSud, Avril 2004. It should be indicated also that Senegal doesn’t seem to be self sufficient in 
poultry production at the moment. 
17 According to the FAO study it was 16,600 tonnes. Other figures indicate 11,950 tonnes in 2003. 
This last figure seems more reliable, looking at the national production of about 25,000 tonnes in 
2003. 
18 Pomme de terre et oignon locaux snobés au profit des importations. Le Soleil, 1er mars 2003 ; 
L’oignon fait pleurer les producteurs. Le Quotidien, 7 juillet 2004 ; Campagne horticole 2003 : les 
importations menacent la production locale, Le Soleil, 8 mars 2003 ; Echos des marchés : La pomme 
de terre et l’ oignon locaux résistent aux importations, Le Soleil, 3 juillet 2004. 
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between 2000 and 2004. A decline has been reported in 2004, due to new 
legislation on imports.19 Senegalese NGOs indicate that these imports create 
enormous environmental problems in particular in Dakar. They see it as dumping 
of European of European garbage in African countries. The Senegalese 
government is preparing a law which should stop the import of second hand cars 
that are more than five years old, but at the other side these imports are 
generating quite some custom revenues for the Senegalese government. Custom 
revenues on second hand cars were estimated at more than a quarter of total 
customs income of the Senegalese government in the first three years of the new 
millennium.20
Fisheries
‘The Fisheries Agreement is a commercial agreement and those who state that it 
isn’t, is not honest’, is a statement one can hear from fisheries officials in Dakar: 
‘Europe has bought itself access to Senegalese fishing waters for its vessels’. 
They also stress that there is a total incoherence between the agreement and its 
goals at the one side, and the goals of conservation of fishing resources and of 
development at the other side. Senegal has limited possibilities to control foreign 
vessels. Even the money that the EU offers in return for the access is seen as a 
danger, since the Ministry of Fisheries now had to fight with the Ministry of 
Finance for every penny to develop the sector and for conservation. It is then 
easy to conclude, stresses a spokesmen from the Ministry that there is a total 
incoherence between the official discourse and the practice.  
The situation in the Senegalese fisheries is very complex. To describe it as a 
competition between Senegalese artisanal fishermen and modern Spanish 
vessels, as is sometimes done, is a clear simplification. There are several actors 
involved and a series of species that are not all overexploited. Its is important to 
keep in mind that one out of 6 active Senegalese tries to earn his money in 
fisheries. 
The demand from Europe is growing not only for the noble species, but also 
for other fish to be reproduced into fish meal and to be integrated into cattle feed.  
All this is said to create heavy pressure on the Senegalese resources. All 
Senegalese actors indicate that it should be the central goal of Senegalese 
fisheries policy to enlarge the added value and to have landings and 
transformation to take place in Senegal as much as possible. 
The export conditions for the Senegalese fisheries are rather difficult. The 
Senegalese position in the international competition is not very strong, since 
production costs are high, due to the high level of employment and low per 
capita production. 600.000 people work in the fisheries sector. Production costs 
are also high because, the Senegalese banks are not fit to finance this sector and 
thus are loans expensive. Interest rates are high and high bank guarantees are 
needed to get finance. Furthermore prices of electricity and water make it 
difficult for the Senegalese fisheries to compete. Also in this sector there is a 
general feeling that Senegal has much to loose with the institution of an EPA. 
19 Les importations des ‘venants’ tamisées par la nouvelle réglementation : de 1500 à 300 voitures par 
moi. Le Soleil, 23 juin 2004. 
20 Le Quotidien, 8 April 2003. 
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Now Senegal is in the advantage, since Asian producer have to pay a 24% 
customs tax and Senegal nil. It is afraid of loosing this advantage. 
Phyto-sanitary regulations present another problem. European regulations are 
rather strict, but clear. They are not tested under the conditions of a tropic 
country though. Beside that the way the regulations are put into practice in the 
Member States might differ quite substantially. Member states should comply 
with the norms and standards of Brussels is the general feeling. The European 
Commission itself does not have a control bureau in Senegal. France is quoted to 
have supported projects in this sector to make it easier to comply with norms and 
standards. 
The negotiations on a new agreement in 2001-2002 were depicted as ‘very 
tough’. Nine rounds of negotiations were necessary to come to an agreement. 
The EU started the negotiations by demanding a 60% increase in tonnage 
compared with the former agreement. The Senegalese from their side wanted a 
reduction in tonnage and fishing zones and no fishing rights for European vessels 
for some socially sensitive (sardinelles) or overexploited species. Other sensitive 
issues in the negotiations were technical matters as duration of the licences, 
fishing gear, biological rest periods, boarding of fishermen and controllers, and 
fishing zones. The negotiations were blocked during six months over Senegalese 
propositions to change the fishing zones. For the first time Civil Society 
organisations as organisations of fishermen and of the fish industry took part in 
the negotiations. This strengthened the negotiating position of the Senegalese, 
forced the EU to several concessions and led to an agreement on several 
technical matters. But in the last negotiation round as well the negotiator of the 
Ministry of Fisheries was substituted and the Civil Society organisations were 
not welcome anymore. There are suggestions that the EU forced the Senegalese 
government to change negotiators, as happened later, in 2004, also in the 
negotiations with Mauritania.  
The agreement was finally signed in June 2002 for the period July 2003 until 
30 June 2006. It gives 68 European vessels, of which 45 tuna trawlers, the right 
to fish in Senegalese waters. Additionally some 84.000 tonnes per year of 
demersal species could be fished, of which a small part should be landed in 
Senegalese ports. Compensation paid for the agreements amount to 16 million 
per year (from € 12 million in the former agreement). This was far less than what 
Senegal originally demanded. € 3 million of that amount is reserved for special 
activities to foster sustainable fisheries (€ 500,000), for security in artisanal 
fisheries (€ 500,000), for research (€ 500,000) and for inspection and control (€ 
700,000).21
Criticisms on the agreement focus on four aspects. The first is that the 
compensation that the EU pays is only for a small part reserved (€ 3 million) in 
the fisheries sector in research and training. The ‘décaissement’ of these projects 
is very slow, because there are rather strict rules on counterpart funds. The 
Ministry of Finance is said to use the existence of these special funds to curtail 
the Ministry of Fisheries  organisation complain that two years after the signing 
of the agreement the Senegalese government did not start any project yet for the 
development of the fisheries sector. Several organisations indicate that the 
Senegalese government lacks a strategy for the development of the sector. 
21 Règlement (CE) No. 2323/2002, Journal Officiel des Communautés européennes, 349/4, 24 
Décembre 2002. 
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Organisations of fishermen and industrialists indicate that in their opinion a 
major part of the compensation that the EU pays, should be invested in the 
fisheries sector. The EU does finance also, together with the French AFD, the 
project PAPA Sud which is meant to promote a better quality of fish products. 
The second point of critique is that the agreement also gives access to fishing 
grounds and species which are overexploited, like most wanted species as the 
thiof. These are species which are of interest in particular for Senegalese 
fishermen and are in majority exported to France to be consumed by African 
immigrants. Access to the coastal zone for European vessels is thus seen as 
incoherent with European development cooperation policy but also with those of 
sustainable fisheries. These zones should have been left for artisanal fisheries to 
have these more involved in the export game. 
The so-called ‘compagnies mixtes’ are seen also as a way to transfer 
overcapacity in Europe to a developing country. But the situation is complex 
here also, since it are not alone European ship-owners which create this type of 
companies. Also some Koreans are reported to be involved, in particular in the 
‘bateaux de rammassage’, which go out with a number of pirogues on their deck 
to fish also in Mauritanian waters. 
In general, by all Senegalese actors, the fishing agreement is seen as a 
commercial agreement, with little to no comprehension for the sustainability of 
Senegalese fisheries or for development goals. It is indicated however that the 
‘pauses biologique’ in September and October in the Senegalese case are well 
defined, but at the same time people interviewed pointed at the Mauritania 
Agreement in which after quite some pressure from the European side the 
biological rest period is October and November, with the effect that European 
vessels can stay in the region to fish. It should be noted that the biological rest 
period in the former agreement was only optional. The more general comment 
here is that it is still very difficult for Senegal, with its limited technical 
capabilities,22 to control European  (and other third countries’) vessels. 
The general conclusion then is that the European Commission is forced by the 
European Parliament which follows this dossier quite closely, to use a ‘langue du 
bois’, when it present the fisheries agreements. The Commission promotes them 
as ‘partnership agreements’ while in effect and on basis of a closer analysis they 
are purely commercial and negotiated in an intransigent way. 
Conclusions
Policy coherence is a relative new concept both in political science as well as in 
the formulation and implementation) policy itself. It is defined in this article as 
‘the non-occurrence of policies or the results of policies that are contrary to the 
objectives of a given policy’. You don’t need to be a visionary or utopianist 
thinker23 to assess that there are many causes for incoherencies to exist. One of 
the most important ones is that the interests of important producer groups or 
consumers are at stake and that these have a heavier weight in the formulation 
and implementation of policies then the interests of producers in developing 
countries. 
22 It is said that there is only one plain for surveillance, but that this is not functioning. 
23 As van Naerssen (2006) depicts Mao Zedong: a visionary thinker and merciless leader. 
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In Morocco incoherencies that were presented by the respondents dealt in 
particular with external coherence issues. Incoherencies that were put forward in 
most obstinate form were in the fields of migration, market access and fisheries. 
In its relations with the EEC/EU Morocco has in the last 48 years been a victim 
of a lack of complementarity in production structures with Southern European 
member states. Morocco had to try to get access for a series of the same products 
(citrus fruits, vegetables, textiles and clothing) for which old and new member 
states were looking for protection in Brussels. From this perspective European 
policies vis-à-vis Southern Mediterranean countries like Morocco and Tunisia 
have not been very coherent giving priority first to member states’ interest at cost 
of old trade links and the development of these with Morocco and Tunisia. 
In particular Europe’s agricultural policies did hamper the development of the 
agricultural sector in Morocco, giving all the chances to citrus production in 
Spain, not leaving any space for Morocco’s production to develop and extend its 
export. Since Morocco stayed most of the time in the midst of Europe’s trade 
preferences pyramid, clearly behind the ACP countries, the EU was also not very 
coherent in its own stated goals with regard to Article 138 of the Treaty of 
Rome, safeguarding old trade relationships, neither to its regularly stated 
objectives of creating a zone of peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean.  
Fisheries is one of the most sensitive dossiers in the European-Morocco 
relationship. The Moroccan side sees a clear incoherence here between the stated 
objectives of Europe’s Mediterranean policy and the way the EU gave preference 
to Spanish interests. A second hotly debated theme is immigration. It is generally 
felt in Morocco that the EU connects immigration too much with security and 
ignores the development issues that are at stake also. 
In Senegal respondents put forward a mix of Internal and External coherence 
issues. Again fisheries and migration issues, but also ‘calendar incoherence’ 
(long time delays) and problems with dumping of agricultural produce. The 
Senegalese fisheries sector is very complex with a large number of actors on the 
stage. The depletion of fisheries resources, of some species, is clearly at stake. 
Since Senegal is one of the few African states with a huge fishermen population 
and an important position of fish in the daily diet, the EU should not have 
allowed – an in this sense its policy is incoherent - that under the Fisheries 
Agreement European ships again got access to fishing grounds close to the coast. 
Senegalese producers clearly suffer from import surges of agricultural 
products from Europe, leftovers of a ‘spoilt’ market and dumped in Africa. Most 
cited examples are onions, potatoes, and chicken legs. The latter are sold in 
Dakar’s supermarkets in plastic bags, frozen without any specification of country 
of origin and limit of consumption dates. If the EU at the same time tends to 
foster agricultural development in Senegal, its policies could be considered as 
incoherent when it subsidizes these exports in direct or indirect ways. 
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